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Cooperation Survives and 
Cheating Pays in a Dynamic 
Network Structure with 
Unreliable Reputation
Alberto Antonioni1,2,3, Angel Sánchez2,3,4 & Marco Tomassini1,2
In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or 
economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usualy, information about prospective 
counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is 
further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, 
we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interactions. 
Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We ind that the 
aggregate cooperation level is practicaly unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be afected 
by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we ind two distinct types of behavior, one of 
reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artiicialy fake their reputation in almost every 
interaction. Cheaters end up being better of than honest individuals, who not only keep their true 
reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of 
fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These indings point to the importance of 
ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.
In present-day networked society a great many social and commercial interactions take place on internet1. In 
most instances, such interactions involve people who know each other only through an online identity2, without 
any connection whatsoever in the physical world. his is the case, for example, of internet platforms alowing pri-
vate sales or exchanges among individuals3,4. In a diferent but related seting, a host of internet services and phys-
ical businesses (e.g., restaurants, hotels, etc.) rely on their online reputation to atract and keep their customers. 
Key to al these interactions is the reliability of the knowledge on the interaction counterpart, an issue that gen-
erates enormous concern these days due to the mounting evidence of fraud5. Consumer review websites such as 
Yelp or TripAdvisor use sophisticated analysis tools to remove (positive or negative) fake reviews; in fact, a whole 
new technical sub-ield caled Online Reputation Management dealing with how to detect, avoid, and eliminate 
fake reviews in online sites has recently arisen6,7. hese concerns are even more pressing when personal identities, 
whose reliability is not externaly checked, are the only available information about a possible interaction partner.
In this paper, we address this issue by framing the question in a simpliied environment as a dyadic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD)8,9 which lends itself to an experimental approach. Indeed, in online exchanges such as those 
described above, the best joint outcome obtains when both parties involved meet their end of the bargain, but 
both of them have clear incentives to cheat. In this situation, the game-theoretical prediction picks out defec-
tion as the rational choice in this game, but cooperation is oten observed in our society and, in particular, in 
online exchanges. To explain this apparent paradox, several mechanisms have been proposed (see10 for a recent 
review), most of which rely on some form of positive assortment between cooperators11, i.e., cooperators interact 
with individuals of similar behavior and avoid cheaters. In this context, both theoretical models12–16 and recent 
experiments with human subjects17–21,23 have established that cooperation may evolve to a remarkable degree 
when individuals control with whom they interact. Crucialy for our present purposes, the process depends on 
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the availability of information on current and possible partners, which subjects then use to evaluate reputa-
tion20,21,23–29 and to decide on their connections. It is then clear that the cooperation-promotion mechanism can 
act only if reputation scores are truthful, realy relecting the actual individual’s record and are not manipulated 
in any way.
Here we contribute to the research on fake reputation and its efects by carrying out a controled experiment30 
using a PD experiment with the possibility for participants to modify their behavior record by paying a cost. 
Such cost represents the efort that has to be done to pay or convince somebody else to alter our reputation in 
order to appear beter than that we actualy are or to decrease the reputation of a competitor. We could also have 
considered a cost-free alteration of one’s reputation but, this fact being common knowledge in the experiment, it 
would have made the concept of a reputation almost useless. Our setup alows us to study whether having individ-
uals with fake reputations around can undermine the evolution of cooperation and the success of dyadic online 
exchanges. his experimental approach, which to the best of our knowledge has not been atempted before, com-
plements nicely the work carried out from the viewpoint of analyzing fraud evidence and associated behaviors in 
real systems31. As we wil see, our results provide new insights on how people behave when they have the possibil-
ity to cheat and what are the consequences for the group: hus, we wil show that cooperation is not suppressed by 
the presence of individuals with fake reputation, but the society splits in two groups, one of them exploiting the 
other by cheating, leading to a sizeable increase in global inequality.
Experimental setup
In our experimental sessions, seven groups of twenty subjects connected in a social network played a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) game8,9 with their neighbors. In this two-person game, players must decide whether to cooper-
ate (C) or to defect (D) and, similarly to several recent experimental setings (e.g.17–19,21,23), the chosen action is 
the same with al neighbors. Note that if actions could be chosen independently for each neighbor the network 
disappears, and the system is simply a colection of independent pairwise games. If both agents cooperate, each 
receives a payof R. If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector receives T and the cooperator receives 
the payof S. If both defect, each receives P. Since T > R > P ≥ S, defection is a dominant strategy and a rational 
payof-maximizing player wil choose to defect, although mutual cooperation yields a higher colective payof, 
whence the dilemma. Subjects played a weak PD game (P = S) with their immediate neighbors with T = 10, R = 7, 
P = 0, and S = 0. Payof values are the same as those used in21,22, where it was shown that when the game is played 
on a static network cooperation decays, while the possibility to rewire links alows for its emergence and stability 
when information about past actions of others, which amounts to their reputation, is available. he initial set of 
connections between the participants was chosen to be a regular latice of degree 4. Participants played 30 rounds 
of the sequence described below, although this exact number was unknown to them; they were only told that they 
would play for a number of rounds between 20 and 50 and without showing them the current round number.
Here, the reputation of a player is expressed through a cooperation index α which is the number of times the 
player has cooperated in the last ive moves, thus α ∈ [0, 5]. We considered two treatments: a baseline one, caled 
Real Reputation (RR) in which the cooperation index cannot be manipulated, and a modiied one in which par-
ticipants were informed that al of them were alowed to vary their cooperation index by paying a cost, caled Fake 
Reputation (FR). At the beginning, al players receive an initial α of 3 based on the actions sequence CDCDC. 
Note that this form of reputation is related to but diferent from the one used in21,23. While in those earlier studies 
explicit past choices of each player were available to al others, in our experiment, there is some uncertainty about 
the current behavior of a player even in the RR treatment. his uncertainty comes about because only the number 
of cooperative actions of the current irst neighbors and potential partners is known, but not their order. In addi-
tion, neighbors are just unlabeled anonymous individuals who cannot be recognized from one round to the next. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that most of the reputation subjects assign to partners arises from their average 
cooperativeness without reference to the chronological set of actions21. On the other hand, this is also the case 
in many e-commerce platforms (e.g., Amazon) where only an average success rate of interactions with external 
selers is provided. In this sense, our setup reproduces a real-world situation in which a subject interacts with a 
partner for the irst time, i.e., when irst-hand information about the partner is not available.
In the RR treatment each round consisted of the folowing four stages:
1.Action choice
2.Neighborhood modiication
3.Link acceptance decision
4.Feedback on payofs
In the irst stage, players receive information on the cooperation index of their current neighbors and have
to select one of two actions, A or B, where A implied “cooperation” and B implied “defection”, the action being 
the same with al neighbors, as said above. We chose to label actions in a neutral fashion to prevent framing 
efects32,33. In the second stage, participants may decide to unilateraly suppress a link with a neighbor and they 
are also given the option to ofer a link to a new, randomly chosen partner; in both cases, they only know the α 
value of the corresponding subject. In the folowing stage, participants see al link proposals from other players 
(and their α), which they can either accept or reject. Ater these decision stages a new network is formed, and 
subjects accumulate their payof by playing the PD game in pairs with their current neighbors. hey are neither 
informed about their neighbors’ payofs nor about their neighbors’ individual current actions. Participants never 
know the ful network topology.
he FR treatment is identical to the RR treatment with the folowing fundamental diference: Participants 
never know whether the observed cooperation index α of their partners is the real one or has been modiied. 
Consequently, in this setup there is an additional stage between stages 1 and 2 of the RR treatment during which 
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participants may choose to pay a cost in order to modify their α value. he chosen cost was 4 points for each 
unity of reputation modiied, per round. For example, if a player has currently an α value of 2 based on her actual 
last ive actions, she can decide to pay 8 points to show an observable cooperation index of 4 to the partners. his 
modiication only lasts for the current round. If a player wants to change her observable α again for the folowing 
round she has to pay the cost anew. Apart from that, as in the RR treatment, there is no cost implied if one just 
wants to show her true cooperation index. Before choosing the above value of four for the cost we performed a 
preliminary laboratory session in which the cost was set to nine points instead. In that case, we observed that very 
few players chose to pay that cost to modify their observable α. Conversely, if the cost is too smal then the players 
would cheat too frequently which would make the cooperation index signal almost useless.
We performed the RR treatment six times where three groups of 20 participants performed the same experi-
ment two times each. he FR treatment was run eight times by four groups each playing two times. Before each 
new session, we re-initialized the regular latice by reshuling the participants who played the same experiment 
in the same treatment condition for other 30 rounds.
Results
We now turn to the discussion of our experimental results. First, we look at the behavior of the average cooper-
ation index α for the baseline case (RR) and for the fake reputation case (FR), see Fig. 1. he time evolution of 
cooperation in the population, which is noisier, paralels that of α and it can be found in the SI, Fig. S1.
We now compare the aggregate cooperation frequency results with those obtained in similar recent exper-
imental studies17–21,23. However, one must bear in mind that, although the setings are similar in the sense that 
participants can cut or form links at diferent rates, the details difer either in link updating frequency, partner 
accepting rules, information available to the players and, most importantly, the PD payof matrix values used. 
In Rand et al.17, the “luid dynamic network” treatment is similar to ours, although links to cut and to create are 
randomly chosen and presented to the players. he information set is also diferent: the focal player knows the 
last action of the player at the other end of a random link. In these conditions, Rand et al. ind that the cooper-
ation frequency stays around 0.6 during al rounds. In Wang et al.18 players update their links at various rates. 
Information consists in the knowledge of the last ive moves of al players. Cooperation stays high at the begin-
ning (more than 0.8) for almost al update frequencies and tends to decay in the inal rounds. his behavior is 
rather expected since this is the only study among those mentioned in which the participants know the exact 
number of rounds and they are thus eager to defect in the last ones. In Antonioni et al.20 information on the last 
action of a potential neighbor is costly to participants and it strongly inluences the outcome of the experiment. 
In fact, inal cooperation frequencies oscilate between 0.4 and 0.6 for the two values of the cost. On the other 
hand, when this information is costless cooperation frequency can reach 0.8–0.9. In Cuesta et al.21 the authors 
investigate how the amount of reputation available inluences cooperation in a dynamical environment in which 
unwanted links can be cut and new ones formed in a manner qualitatively similar to al previously described 
setings. Reputation is given by the sequence of the last m actions of any given player where m can be varied 
between 0 and 5. he authors ind that there is a clear positive correlation between m and the cooperation level. 
For m = 0 cooperation quickly decays from an initial 0.5 to 0.2 at the end of the runs. On the other hand when 
Figure 1. True and observable cooperation index α in the whole population aggregating al treatments 
in the baseline case (RR, black dots) and the case with fake reputation (FR, blue squares). he observable 
α in the FR treatment is represented by the red triangles. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
he diference between inal mean values of true α is not statisticaly signiicant [irst repetition, P = 0.416; 
both repetitions, P = 0.336]. he diference between inal mean values of RR true α and FR observable α is 
statisticaly signiicant considering both repetitions [irst repetition, P = 0.138; both repetitions, *P = 0.019].
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m > 0 cooperation is sustained with m = 3and m = 5 giving statisticaly indistinguishable results with a roughly 
constant cooperation level between 0.5 and 0.6. In Galo and Yan23 there are four treatments which difer in the 
amount of information participants have about their partners and about the whole network. In the baseline treat-
ment subjects only know the previous ive actions of their direct neighbors, while in the most information-rich 
environment they know the previous ive actions of al players, as wel as the topological structure of the current 
network. he remaining two setings are in between the previous ones. Concerning the level of cooperation, they 
found that global reputational knowledge is the main determinant for the sustenance of cooperation, which stays 
at about 0.5–0.6 over the whole period. Knowledge of the structure of the whole network does not help. By con-
trast, in the seting in which reputational knowledge is only local cooperation stays at about 0.3. Finaly, in Fehl 
et al.19 cooperation reaches high levels around 0.7 but their seting cannot be compared with ours, nor with the 
above ones because agents there can choose a diferent action with diferent neighbors.
With respect to the above-mentioned studies where cooperation is high and remains stable in dynamical 
networks when information about the partners’ strategy is complete, in our case cooperation is maintained but at 
a lower level (see also Fig. S1 in the SI). We believe that the reason for this diference is to be found in the higher 
level of uncertainty. Even when α cannot be faked (RR treatment), the single index that people see being an aver-
age and not the true temporal sequence of actions, does not alow cooperative acts to be identiied with certainty 
and participants are let guessing to some extent. In fact, al sessions started with a fraction of cooperators of 
about 0.6 and this fraction was about 0.5 at the end (see also Fig. S1 in the SI). On the other hand, as shown in21, 
knowledge of the last action of possible partners plays an important part in reputation assignment, going from 
almost 30% when information comprises the last 3 actions to more than 16% with 5 actions. his missing piece 
of information may lead subjects to estimate their counterparts’ reputation to be lower than what they would do 
with more information, and therefore to decrease their cooperativeness. Whatever the case, it is important to 
notice that cooperation based on this kind of easily manipulable reputation system stil seems to be fairly high, 
although our results are not conclusive about the possibility that it wil eventualy decay. Hence, at least as far as 
irst interactions are concerned, we did not observe a serious hampering of the wilingness to cooperate. Other 
explanations on the observed cooperative behavior are also possible e.g., the inluence of the payof matrix val-
ues34,35 and group sizes36,37. Unfortunately, we were not able to run another seting because of time and inancial 
constraints.
Let us now move into between-subject diferences in behavior. To that end, in Fig. S3 (see SI) we analyze the 
average participants’ frequency of cooperation in deciles for the RR treatment (black bars) and for the FR treat-
ment (blue bars). Interestingly, it can be seen that in the RR treatment about one third of the participants cooper-
ate between 50% and 60% of the times. Such a peak of cooperation is not observed in the FR treatment where the 
frequencies tend to be more uniform. In fact, in the FR treatment some participants decided to maintain a lower 
cooperation frequency and to increase their observable cooperation index paying the cost.
Figure 2 sheds more light on this issue by representing the position of each player in a space where the 
x-coordinate is the player’s average number of points paid per round and the y-coordinate is her cooperation 
frequency for al sessions of the FR treatment. It can be clearly seen that most players cheat only rarely, buying less 
than half a point per round. hus we have, somewhat arbitrarily but sensibly, traced the dividing line at this point. 
Figure 2. Scaterplot of the participants main behavioral features in the FR treatment. he x-axis value is 
the average number of points that a given player has paid per round while the y-axis represents her frequency 
of cooperation. he red line separates the area containing participants we have caled reliable (let side) players 
from the so-caled cheaters (right side), while the doted diagonal limits the feasible space a player can be in. 
Inset: histogram of the proportion of participants who buy a certain amount of points per round on average.
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As wil be shown below, this criterion does relect very wel the two main types of behavior in the population. We 
have dubbed the players that appear in the area to the let of this red line “reliables”. By contrast, the rest of the 
players, those who buy more than half a point per round in the average, wil be caled “cheaters”. Among reliables, 
we observe a heterogeneous behavior: Some are essentialy cooperators (top let corner of the scaterplot), some 
are mostly defectors (botom let corner), and the rest have a mixed behavior. Cheaters, on the other hand, coop-
erate less on average. he inset summarizes this information in an aggregate manner by showing the proportion 
of players that buy a certain amount of points per round. Reliable players are seen to be around 60% of the total. 
Most cheaters buy between 0.5 and 2.0 points per round, while very few increase their α by more than two points 
per round. his suggests that most cheaters tend to stick to an observable cooperation index of about three in 
order not to trigger link cuting from neighbors. Also, we plot the normalized number of players purchasing 
points per round and per participant type in Fig. S8 of the SI.
In order to conirm the above hypothesis we plot in Fig. 3 the histograms of the cooperation index in the 
population for the two categories of subjects. We expect that, if our deinition makes sense, reliable players should 
have very similar true and observable α, and this is indeed the case. his does not hold for cheaters, who tend 
to increase their observable α when the true one is 0 or 1 comparing the histograms in Fig. 3a,b. his is quite 
understandable given the seting of the experiment and supports our interpretation, namely that the participants’ 
apparent goal seems to be to show a cooperation index of about three, which guarantees a “fair” behavior on the 
part of the neighbors who wil not be tempted to cut their link to them. In this respect, it is important to note that 
the general appearance of the histogram of observable α for cheaters is very similar to that of reliables (Fig. 3b), 
indicating that cheaters grasp what the acceptable behavior should be. If any, the main diference is that the his-
togram for cheaters is more peaked around three, i.e., there are fewer cheaters showing a very high α, in agree-
ment with our intuition that they do not need to look very cooperative. In our experiment we have noticed that 
participants severe a link about 20% of the time both in the RR and FR treatments. In this respect, Fig. S6 shows 
that subjects are quite heterogenous in their link cuting frequency, with a majority of them cuting links less than 
20% of the time while others severe their connections much more oten (even up to 80% in some cases). From 
Fig. 3b we can also infer that cheaters use their observable α to avoid having their links cut of as they appear to be 
“reliable”. heir observable α also helps them to be accepted by other players in the link proposal phase. his can 
also be inferred from Fig. S7, that shows that the higher the α of an individual, the more likely her acceptance as 
a new neighbor. Interestingly, in the FR treatment new links have a smaler acceptance rate than in the RR treat-
ment, which is most probably due to the uncertainty about the observable α. On the other hand, the diferences 
between reliables and cheaters give rise also to noticeable traces on the aggregate behavior: he cooperation level 
of reliables is considerably larger than that of cheaters (cf. Fig. S1 in the SI), while their combination mimics the 
true cooperation index of the RR treatment (cf. Fig. S2a in the SI). Again, the observable cooperation index turns 
out to be almost the same for both kind of players (cf. Fig. S2b in the SI). It is also remarkable that reliables exhibit 
Figure 3. Frequency of experimental cooperation indices in the FR treatment separately for cheater and 
reliable players and for al treatments and rounds. (a) he panel depicts the frequency of the true cooperation 
index; (b) the panel shows the observable cooperation index. Note that, while reliables behave coherently 
and have similar α proiles, cheaters cooperate much less but tend to show an observable cooperation index 
comparable to that of reliables. he diference in distribution between true cooperation indices is always 
statisticaly signiicant when observed at the beginning and the end of the treatment [irst repetition at irst 
round,**P = 0.003; both repetitions, ***P < 0.001; irst repetition at last round, ***P < 0.001; both repetitions, 
***P < 0.001]. he diference in distribution between observable cooperation indices is never statisticaly 
signiicant [1st at irst round, P = 0.509; both, P = 0.640; 1st at last round, P = 0.985; both, P = 0.388]. he 
diference in distribution for reliable players is never statisticaly signiicant [P > 0.9] while for cheater players is 
always statisticaly signiicant [***P < 0.001] at the beginning and the end of the treatment. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean.
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a somewhat larger cooperation, as if their honest behavior in terms of reputation would be associated to higher 
cooperativeness (in a manner not unrelated to the “phenotypes” reported by Peysakhovich et al.38). We also men-
tion the work by Biziou-van-pol et al.39 who studied the relation between cooperation, altruism, and aversion to 
teling white lies. White lies are those that increase the beneit of the liar and/or somebody else. Speciicaly, the 
authors ind that there is a negative correlation between teling white lies that beneit both the other person and 
the liar and cooperative behavior. his is in line with our indings but one should bear in mind that our subjects 
tel so caled “black lies”, which are those that increase a person’s beneit at the expense of another.
So far, we have reported that while the level of cooperation observed in the two treatments is basicaly the 
same, the population in the FR treatment shows a clear spliting in two subpopulations, reliables and cheaters. 
Does this segregation lead to noticeable consequences at the population level? To answer this question, Fig. 4 
shows the experimental average cumulated payof, or social wealth, by treatment and type of player as a func-
tion of the round number. First, we note that participants have the best payof in the RR treatment (black dots). 
We interpret this result as being a consequence of three factors: a slightly higher cooperation level in the RR 
treatment (see Fig. 1), the absence of a cost to increase one’s reputation, and a slightly higher average degree 
of the players network in the RR case (cf. SI, Fig. S4). Likewise, the blue squares in Fig. 4 reports the cumu-
lated wealth in the FR treatment whereas the green and orange symbols show, respectively, the cumulated 
gain for reliables and cheaters taking the cost into account. An interesting result is that cheaters gain more 
than reliables in spite of paying the cost of cheating. Having a higher reputation alows a cheater to maintain 
and create more connections to neighbors (cf. SI, Fig. S4) which tends to increase her payof. Furthermore, a 
cheater tends to defect more oten and thus to earn the maximum payof T in many encounters. hus, although 
when cheating is possible the total gain is less than in the RR treatment, we see now that it is more proitable 
to a be a cheater in the FR seting. As a result, the inequality in our “society” increases: he fact that cheaters 
earn a higher payof leads to a Gini coeicient of 0.370 in the FR treatment, to be compared to a value of 0.271 
in the RR treatment, both indices being calculated on the cumulated wealth of participants at the end of the 
experiment.
For completeness, we also show the time evolution of the participants’ payof in the SI, Fig. S5. Now, compar-
ing the cumulated gain of cheaters in the FR treatment with the cumulated gain in the RR treatment shows that 
there is litle diference but the payof is slightly larger in the later. hus, although it pays to be a cheater when 
faking one’s reputation is alowed, if nobody is alowed to do it the social wealth is higher, at least as far as this 
experiment is concerned.
Discussion
In summary, we have designed and carried out an experiment in order to test the efects of uncertainty about 
the reputation of possible partners in the frame of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Our experiment provides us 
with enough evidence to support several important conclusions. To begin with, the aggregate cooperation level 
of the population does not change when reputations can be faked. Interestingly, this is in agreement with the 
only game-theoretical work we know of in this context: Röhl et al.40 showed, in an evolutionary public goods 
game, that fake reputation does not harm cooperation under some conditions in wel-mixed populations. We 
Figure 4. Cumulated participants’ wealth averaged over al sessions for the RR (black dots) and FR (blue 
squares) treatments. In the later case we also plot the wealth for reliables (green squares), and cheaters (orange 
triangles) separately. he cost for reputation modiication is taken into account. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean. he diference between inal mean values of cumulated wealth for RR and FR treatment is 
statisticaly signiicant considering both repetitions [irst repetition, P = 0.189; both repetitions, *P = 0.023].
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must stress that their approach is quite diferent from ours, in particular because every individual interacts with 
every other one and cannot modify this interaction neighborhood. On the other hand, Röhl et al. introduce a 
probability to be discovered and punished which is reminiscent of the link-cuting stage of our experiment: Note 
that our subjects cut links without knowing for sure that the corresponding individual is a cheater, which is not 
unrelated to probabilistic discovery. herefore, in spite of the diferences, the fact that our observation aligns 
with the predictions in40 is certainly suggestive. Another interesting line of research related to the indings we 
are reporting here is that of image scoring in evolutionary games24,41, based on the idea that helping someone 
increases one’s image score, whereas refusing to help reduces it. his is clearly similar to the notion of reputation, 
except that when it is kept by each individual separately it becomes private instead of public as we consider here. 
In this regard, it has been recently shown27 that when there is information on group scoring only a few images 
are needed to sustain reputation. his points to the possibility of preventing the problems of faking reputation by 
externaly providing some manner of (truthful) group information.
Nevertheless, our results go further than this as they point to a spliting of the experimental population in two 
diferent types of individuals: reliables, who cheat very litle if at al, and cheaters, who are wiling to fake their 
reputation almost at every interaction. his cannot be noticed by looking at the cooperation level and only an 
analysis of the within-subject variability alows to uncover this efect. In spite of the fact that cheaters have to pay 
some cost to modify their cooperation index, they stil end up making more proit than reliables, as they manage 
to exhibit an intermediate reputation that makes them less likely targets for link cuting and more likely to be 
accepted as new partners. he similarity between the histogram of the cooperation index in both treatments is 
striking and proves that cheaters have a correct intuition about what is the optimum level of reputation modiica-
tion to do wel. In addition, it turns out that the average earnings of cheaters are very similar to the case in which 
reputation is truthful, which implies that reliables are in practice paying the cost of the cheaters’ eforts to disguise 
their bad behavior. On the other hand, reliables are honest not only with respect to their reputation, but also about 
being even more cooperative than the general population in the baseline treatment. As a result of the combination 
of reliable and cheating behaviors, inequality increases: the Gini coeicient of the RR treatment increases by more 
than a 30% in the FR treatment; for a comparison which only has ilustrative value, these would be values similar, 
respectively, to Finland in 2008 and Tanzania in 200742. We therefore conclude that, in our experiment, even if the 
level of cooperation in interactions is basicaly the same as when reputation is truthful, the features that emerge 
from the possibility of faking reputations are the spliting into exploiters and exploited, and a larger degree of ine-
quality, both highly undesirable. While this is a irst step in the experimental analysis of the problem that cannot 
be easily generalized to more complex social environments, it is clear that the conclusions are stil very relevant 
and would justify further, intensive research along these lines, in order to inform policy makers’ eforts to ensure 
fair and transparent trade.
Methods
he use of human subjects in this experiment has been approved by the Ethics Commitee of the University of 
Lausanne and our methods were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. Participants signed an 
informed consent describing the nature of the experiment before they entered into the laboratory. We conducted 
a total of seven experimental sessions in November 2014. Participants were recruited from the pool of undergrad-
uate students from al disciplines of the University of Lausanne and the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale of Lausanne 
using ORSEE43. Subject-subject anonymity was granted at al stages, and the experiment was computerized using 
the z-Tree environment44. Before making decisions, participants read detailed instructions and responded to a 
set of control questions in order to insure common understanding of the game and the computation of payofs. A 
translation of these instructions from the original French is provided in Section S1 of the SI. Each session lasted 
asted one and a half hours and included 20 participants, where a total of 140 subjects, 48 women and 92 men, 
took part in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to the RR treatment (60 subjects) and to the FR 
treatment (80 subjects). Subjects observable demographic variables did not qualitatively difer across treatments. 
Participants received a show-up fee of 10 CHF (about 10.50$), and their inal score in points was converted at an 
exchange rate of 1 CHF = 120 points. he average payof per subject was 27.35 CHF (about 29$). Al statistical 
diference signiicances of mean values have been obtained performing unequal variances t-test analysis. Al 
statistical diference in distribution have been obtained performing two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test anal-
ysis. We considered the ith one as the irst observable and independent round to compare cooperation index 
distributions. Since each group performed two repetitions of the assigned treatment we considered two diferent 
statistical approaches. he irst one takes into account independent observations, thus considering only the irst 
repetition of the treatment, while the second analysis assumes both repetitions of the treatment as two independ-
ent observations.
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CooperationSurvivesandCheatingPaysina
DynamicNetworkStructurewithUnreliable
Reputation
SupplementaryInformation
A.Antonioni,A.Sánchez,andM.Tomassini
TheSupplementaryInformation(SI)providestranslationfromFrenchofthe
exactinstructionsformthatparticipantsreceivedfortheFRtreatmentand
correspondingtrialquestions,seeSection1.InstructionsforthebaselineRR
treatmentareidenticalwithouttheapparentproﬁlestage.
Additionalresultsofexperimentaldatathatarenotshowninthemaintext
arepresentedinSection2.
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1 Instructions(translatedfromFrench)
Welcometothisexperiment!
Youaregoingtotakedecisionsthatwilaﬀectyourpayoﬀsaswelasthe
payoﬀsoftheotherparticipants.
Althoughalpayoﬀsareexpressedinnumberofpoints,thesepointswil
betransformedintomoneyattheendoftheexperimentaccordingtothe
folowingexchangerate:
120pts. =1.-CHF
Duringtheexperimentitisstrictlyforbiddentotalktootherpar-
ticipants.Ifyouhaveaquestion,pleaseasktheassistants.Ifyoudon’t
complywiththeserules,wewilregrettablybeobligedtoexcludeyoufrom
theexperiment.
Inthisexperimenteveryparticipantwilinteractwithhis/her“neighbors”in
anetworkconstitutedbyaltheparticipantsintheroom.Atthebeginning
oftheexperimenteverybodywilhavefourneighborsbutthisnumbermay
changeduringtheexperimentasexplainedbelow.
Duringtheexperimentyou’lonlyseeyourimmediateneighbors,i.e.only
theparticipantswithwhomyouaredirectlylinked;youwilnotseewhat
happensintherestofthenetwork(forinstance,youwon’tbeabletosee
whattheneighborsofyourdirectneighborsaredoing).
Whatisitalabout?
Therewilbeanumberofroundsthatiscomprisedbetween20and50but
theexactnumberwilnotbemadeexplicit. Eachroundconsistsoffour
steps:
1.Decideyouraction
2.Decideyourapparentproﬁle
3. Modifyyourneighborhood
4.Acceptorrefusenewlinks
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1. Decideyouraction
Inthisﬁrststageyouwilhavetochoosean“action”amongthetwofolowing
options:
AorB
Likeyou,yourneighborswilalsohavetotakethesamedecisionabout
theactiontheywilchoose. Thechosenactionisunique:thismeansthat
thesameactionwilbeusedwheninteractingwithalofyourneighbors
(youcan’tusediﬀerentactionswithdiﬀerentneighbors). Yourpayoﬀfor
thecurrentroundiscomputedasafunctionofyourcurrentactionandthe
currentactionsofyourneighbors.
Nowweexplainthepayoﬀsforeachpossiblecombinationofyouractionand
one’sofyourneighborsaction:
•YouchooseAandyourneighborchoosesA:
yougain7pointsandyourneighboralsogets7points.
•YouchooseAandyourneighborchoosesB:
youget0pointsandyourneighborgets10points.
•YouchooseBandyourneighborchoosesA:
yougain10pointsandyourneighborgains0points.
•YouchooseBabdyourneighborchoosesB:
youget0pointsandyourneighborgets0points.
Yourﬁnalaccumulatedpayoﬀineachroundiscomputedasthesumofthe
pointsgainedineachinteractionwitheachofyourcurrentneighbors.
However,therelevantneighborsforthepayoﬀcomputationarethoseto
whomyouaredirectlylinkedattheendofeachround.Asyoushalsee
below,youwilbealowedtomodifyyourneighborhoodinthefolowing
stagesbeforetheroundends.
Thefolowingexamplesilustratethecomputationofyourpayoﬀattheend
ofaround.Notethatintheexamplesyouarethecentralplayer,withyour
actionunderlined,andyouhave4neighborsbutduringtheexperiment
youcouldhaveadiﬀerentnumberofneighbors.
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Example1 :YouractionisA,theactionofalyourneighborsisalsoA
A
AA
AA
.
Yourpayoﬀis:7+7+7+7=28points.
Example2 :YouractionisA,theactionofalyourneighborsisB
A
BB
BB
.
Yourpayoﬀis:0+0+0+0=0points.
Example3 :YouractionisB,theactionofalyourneighborsisA
B
AA
AA
.
Yourpayoﬀis:10+10+10+10=40points.
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Example4 :YouractionisB,theactionofalyourneighborsisalsoB
B
BB
BB
.
Yourpayoﬀis:0+0+0+0=0points.
Example5 :YouractionisA,theactionofthreeofyourneighborsisA
whilethefourthonedoesB
A
AB
AA
.
Yourpayoﬀis:0+7+7+7=21points.
Example6 :YouractionisB,twoofyourneighborsdoAwhiletheother
twodoB
B
AA
BB
.
Yourpayoﬀis:10+10+0+0=20points.
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TheProﬁle
Theproﬁleofaparticipantiscomputedfromthesequenceofher/his
lastﬁveactions.ItisdeﬁnedasthenumberofAsinthesequenceand,
byconsequence,itbelongstotheintegerinterval[0,5]
B B A BA
.
Forexample,ifthepastactionssequenceis:
thecorrespondingproﬁlevalueis2
A A A BB
.
Ifthepastactionssequenceis:
thenthecorrespondingproﬁlevalueis3.
Theabovedeﬁnitionreferstotheproﬁlecaledreal.
Youhavetheoptionofchoosinganapparentproﬁlediﬀerentfromthe
realoneateachround,accordingtotheprocedureexplainedinthenext
sectionofthisdocument. Thisapparentproﬁleistheonethatyour
neighborswilsee.Therealproﬁleisprivateandwilnotbecommuni-
catedtoyourneighborsunlessyourapparentproﬁleistherealone,i.e.
youchoosenottoalteritinthecurrentround.
Ontheotherhand,notethatthecurrentactionsofyourneighborswil
neverbeknowntoyou,onlytheirapparentproﬁles.
IMPORTANT
B A B AA
Notethatatthebeginningoftheexperimentalparticipantswilstart
withthesameinitialsequenceofactionsasfolows:
whichamountstoaninitialproﬁlevalueof3foral.
Duringtheexperimenttheproﬁlewilbedenotedby"P".
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Intheﬁrststageofeachroundyoumustchoosetheactionthatyouwantto
useduringthecurrentroundwiththehelpofthefolowingscreenshot:
Chooseyouractionforthisroundandclickthe"OK"button.
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2. Decideyourapparentproﬁle
Inthisstageyoumustdecidewhattodowithyourproﬁleforthisround.
ImportantNote:eachpointaddedorsubtractedtoyourrealproﬁlewilcost
you4points.Forexample:
•ifyourproﬁlerealvalueis2andyouwouldliketoincreaseittoan
apparentproﬁleof4,youwilhavetopay2×4=8points.
•ifyourrealproﬁleis3andyouwanttohaveanapparentproﬁleof2
thenyoumustpay1×4=4points.
Ifyoudecidetokeepyourapparentproﬁleasyourrealproﬁleitwilcostyou
0pointsasthisisthedefaultvalue.Ifyouwouldliketochangeyourapparent
proﬁlebutyoucannotpayforthecorrespondingpointsyourapparentproﬁle
wilbethesameasyourrealproﬁlefortheround. Alsonotethatduring
theﬁrstroundyoucannotchangeyourapparentproﬁlesincealparticipants
startwith0points.
Youwilchooseyourapparentproﬁleforagiveroundthroughthefolowing
screenshot:
Chooseyourapparentproﬁleforthisroundandclickthe"OK"button.If
youwanttokeepyourrealproﬁleasapparentproﬁlejustclickdirectlythe
"OK"button.
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3. Modifyyourneighborhood
Inthisstageyoumustdecidewhetheryouwanttomodifyyourneighbor-
hood. You’lseeinthescreenthenumberofcurrentneighborsyouhave
aswelasthevaluesoftheirapparentproﬁles. Next,youmustdecidethe
folowing:
•decidewhetheryouwanttocutalinktoaneighborwithacertain
currentapparentproﬁlevalue. Anarbitrarylinktosuchaneighbor
wilbecutautomaticalyandunconditionaly.
•decidewhetheryouwanttoproposealinktoarandomlychosenpar-
ticipantwhoisnotyetoneofyourdirectneighbors.Thesystemwil
madeher/hisapparentproﬁleknowntoyou. Thislinkwilonlybe
createdifthepartnerwilacceptitinthenextstage.Insomecases,
itwilnotbepossibletoproposeyoucreatinganewlink.
Thepossiblemodiﬁcationofyourneighborhoodwilbemadethroughthe
folowingscreenshot:
Choosewhetheryouwanttocutalinkand/orwhetheryouwanttopropose
anewlink,thenclickthe"OK"button.
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4. Acceptorrefusenewlinks
Finaly,inthisstageyoumustdecidewhichlinks,amongthoseproposed
byotherparticipants,youaregoingtoacceptafterknowingtheapparent
proﬁleofthepotentialpartner.Notethatalinkwilonlybecreatedifyou
acceptitatthisstage. Theproposingparticipantdoesalreadyknowyour
apparentproﬁleanddecidedtoproposeyoucreatingthelink.
Youwilcompletethisstagebyusingthefolowingscreenshot:
Foreachlinkproposal,choosewhetheryouwanttoacceptitthenclickthe
"OK"button.
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Endofround
Accordingtothedecisionsofalparticipants,anewnetworkwilbecreated.
Yourpayoﬀfortheroundwilbecomputedasafunctionofyourownaction
andoftheactionsofalyourcurrentneighborsaccordingtotheprocedure
describedinthesection“Decideyouraction”.Fromthispayoﬀvalueitwil
besubtractedthecostofchangingyourapparentproﬁleifyoudecidedto
dosointhisround.
Clickthe"OK"buttontogotothefolowinground.
Didyouunderstandtheexplanations?
Beforestartingtheactualexperimentwewouldliketobesurethatyouand
everybodyelsehascorrectlyunderstoodthedecisionsthatyou’lhaveto
make. Tothisend,pleaseanswerthequestionsthatwilappearonyour
screen. Whenyouaredonewithaquestionclickthe"OK"buttonatthe
bottomofthescreen.
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Trialquestions
Participantsanswerthefolowingtrialquestionsafterreadingtheinstruc-
tions. Wronganswerswerenotacceptedbythesoftwareinordertocontinue
tothefolowingquestion. Participantswereabletobegintheexperiment
onlyansweringcorrectlytoalquestions.
1.Howmanyneighborsdoyouhaveatthebeginningoftheexperiment?
Correctanswer:4neighbors.
2.Supposethatattheendofaroundyouhave3neighbors.Youraction
isAandalyourneighborshavechosenA.
Whichisyourgainattheendofthisround?
Correctanswer:21points.
3.Supposethatattheendofaroundyouhave3neighbors.Youraction
isBandalyourneighborshavechosenA.
Whichisyourgainattheendofthisround?
Correctanswer:30points.
4.Supposethatattheendofaroundyouhave5neighbors.Youraction
isAandthreeofyourneighborshavechosenBwhiletheothertwoof
themhavechosenA.
Whichisyourgainattheendofthisround?
Correctanswer:14points.
5.Supposethatattheendofaroundyouhave5neighbors.Youraction
isBandthreeofyourneighborshavechosenBwhiletheothertwoof
themhavechosenA.
Whichisyourgainattheendofthisround?
Correctanswer:20points.
6.Ifyoudecidetocutoﬀalink,isthelinkautomaticalycutoﬀorisit
necessarythatalsoyourneighboracceptthisdecision?
Correctanswer:Thelinkisautomaticalycutoﬀ.
7.Ifyoudecidetocreatealink,isthelinkautomaticalycreatedoris
itnecessarythatalsoyourneighboracceptthisdecision?
Correctanswer:Thelinkiscreatedonlyifyourneighboracceptsit.
8.Supposethatyourrealproﬁleis3andyouwanttohaveanapparent
proﬁleof1.Howmanypointsdoyouneedtopay?
Correctanswer:8points.
9.Supposethatyourrealproﬁleis0andyouwanttohaveanapparent
proﬁleof3.Howmanypointsdoyouneedtopay?
Correctanswer:12points.
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2 Additionalresults
ThefolowingFig.S1showstheaveragecooperationlevelfortheRRandFR
treatments. Moreover,wealsoshowtheaveragecooperativeactsofreliable
andcheaterplayers,respectively.FigureS2showstheaveragecooperation
indices(trueα,Fig.S2a;observableα
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,Fig.S2b)fortheRRandFRtreat-
ments,andforreliableandcheaterplayers.
FigureS1: AveragecooperationlevelintheexperimentforRRandFR
treatmentsandforreliableandcheaterplayersinthelattercase.Errorbars
representstandarderrorsofthemean. Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁnalmean
valuesofcooperationlevelforreliableandcheaterplayersisstatisticaly
signiﬁcant[ﬁrstrepetition,P∗=0.046;bothrepetitions,P∗∗=0.002].
Otherdiﬀerencesarenotstatisticalysigniﬁcant.
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FigureS2:(a):timeevolutionofthetruecooperationindexinthewhole
populationafteraggregatingalthetreatmentsinthebaselinecase(RR,
blackdots),thefakereputationtreatment(FR,bluesquares),andforre-
liableandcheaterplayers(greensquaresandorangetriangles).(b):time
evolutionfortheobservablecooperationindexforthesamecases.Errorbars
representstandarderrorsofthemean. Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁnalmean
valuesoftruecooperationindexforreliableandcheaterplayersisstatisti-
calysigniﬁcant[ﬁrstrepetition,P∗=0.036;bothrepetitions,P∗∗∗<0.001].
Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁnalmeanvaluesofobservablecooperationindexfor
RRandFRtreatmentisstatisticalysigniﬁcantconsideringbothrepetitions
[ﬁrstrepetition,P=0.138;bothrepetitions,P∗=0.019].Otherdiﬀerences
arenotstatisticalysigniﬁcant.
InFig.S3weshowtheaverageparticipants’frequencyofcooperationin
decilesfortheRRtreatment(blackbars)andfortheFRtreatment(blue
bars).Interestingly,itcanbeseenthatintheRRtreatmentaboutonethird
oftheparticipantscooperatebetween50%and60%ofthetimes.Suchapeak
ofcooperationisnotobservedintheFRtreatmentwherethefrequencies
tendtobemoreuniform.Infact,intheFRtreatmentsomeparticipants
decidedto maintainalowercooperationfrequencyandtoincreasetheir
observablecooperationindexpayingthecost.
ThefolowingFig.S4depictstheevolutionoftheaveragedegreeinthedy-
namicnetworksinRRandFRtreatmentsandincludesreliableandcheater
players.Thenetworkmeandegreetendstoincreasebutitstabilizesandthe
graphneverbecomesacompleteone.Aninterestingeﬀectisthatcheaters
tendtoattractmoreneighborsinthenetworksincetheirobservablecooper-
ationindexisusualyhigherthantheoneofreliableplayers. Wenotethat,
fortechnicalreasons,twogroupsoftheFRtreatmentonlyperformed20
additionalroundsinthesecondsessionofthesametreatment.Alaverages
havebeencomputedtakingthisintoaccount.
14
0−10 20−30 40−50 60−70 80−90
individual cooperation frequency
par
tici
pa
nts
 pr
op
orti
on
0.0
0 
0.0
5 
0.1
0 
0.1
5 
0.2
0 
0.2
5 
0.3
0 
0.3
5
RR treatment
FR treatment
FigureS3: Proportionofparticipants(y-axis)whohavehadagivenfre-
quencyofcooperativeactsduringthewholeexperiment(x
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
20
round
av
era
ge 
 in
divi
du
al  
de
gre
e
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ●
● ● ● ●
● RR treatment
FR treatment
reliable players
cheater players
-axis),cumulated
overalsessionsandgroupedindeciles,fortheRRandFRtreatment.
FigureS4:EvolutionoftheaveragedegreefortheRRandFRtreatments
(alsessionscumulated)andforreliableandcheaterplayersforalsessions
intheFRtreatment.Errorbarsrepresentthestandarderrorofthemean.
Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁnalmeanvaluesofindividualdegreeforreliableand
cheaterplayersisstatisticalysigniﬁcant[ﬁrstrepetition,P∗=0.046;both
repetitions,P∗∗=0.010].Otherdiﬀerencesarenotstatisticalysigniﬁcant.
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FigureS5reportsthetimeevolutionoftheaveragepayoﬀanditshowsthat
participantsgainmoreintheRRtreatmentthanintheFRtreatmentat
altimes.Conversely,weseethatitpaystobeacheaterwithrespecttoa
reliableplayerintheFRtreatment.
FigureS5: Averagepayoﬀperroundinthebaseline(RR)andinthefake
reputation(FR)treatmentrespectively. Wealsoplotaveragepayoﬀper
roundintheFRtreatmentforreliableandcheaterplayersrespectively.Cost
istakenintoaccountintheseﬁgures.Errorbarsrepresentthestandarderror
ofthemean.Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁnalmeanvaluesofindividualpayoﬀfor
RRandFRtreatmentsisstatisticalysigniﬁcantconsideringbothapproaches
[ﬁrstrepetition,P∗=0.072;bothrepetitions,P∗=0.013].Otherdiﬀerences
arenotstatisticalysigniﬁcant.
Subsequently,Fig.S6summarizesthemainfeaturesofindividualplayersby
plottingtheminascatterplotgivenbytheirlinkcuttingfrequencyandtheir
cooperativenessintheRRandFRtreatment,indicatingwhethertheyare
reliablesorcheatersintheFRtreatment.Finaly,Fig.S7depictsthenumber
ofacceptedproposalsintheﬁrststageoftheexperiment,namelywhenour
experimentalsetupoﬀerssubjectsanewlinkwitharandomlychosenplayer,
fortheRRandFRtreatments.
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FigureS6:Scatterplotsoftheplayersasdescribedbytheirlinkcutting
frequency(x-axis)andtheircooperationfrequency(y
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-axis).Eachpointcor-
respondstoanindividualplayer.(a)RRtreatment.(b)FRtreatment.
ColorsintheFRtreatmentindicatewhetheraplayerisareliable(green
dots)oracheater(orangetriangles).
FigureS7:Linkacceptancerateattheﬁrststageofthemodiﬁcationstothe
networkintheexperimentalsetup,i.e.,fractionofrandomlyproposednew
neighborsthatareacceptedasafunctionoftheirobservablecooperation
index. BlackbarscorrespondtotheRRtreatment,bluebarstotheFR
treatment.Errorbarsrepresentstandarderrorofthemean.
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InFig.S8weshowthenormalizednumberofparticipantswhopurchase
points(atleastone)perroundandperparticipanttypeintheﬁrstrepeti-
tionofFRtreatments. Wecanseethatthevastmajorityofcheaterplayers
faketheircooperationindexalmostateveryinteraction,withaparticularin-
creaseduringlastrounds.Ontheotherhand,reliableplayers,bydeﬁnition,
purchasedlessreputationalpointsandtheyconsequentlyhaveasmalerrate.
FigureS8:Averagenormalizednumberofplayerswhopurchasepoints(at
leastone)perroundandperparticipanttypeconsideringonlytheﬁrstrep-
etitionofFRtreatments.Errorbarsrepresentstandarderrorofthemean.
18
